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The Good and the Good Book: Revelation as a Guide to Life
, by Samuel
Fleischacker. Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. 164. $40 (hardcover), $25
(paperback).
C. R. DODSWORTH, Spring Hill College
In this insightful and thought-provoking work, Fleischacker defends what
he calls revealed religion. Essentially all of the major world religions, including Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and Hinduism fall into
this category. What distinguishes these religions is the fact that their beliefs and practices primarily derive not from rational arguments or the
individual religious experiences of their adherents but rather from a text
they take to be revealed, either by God or by an extraordinary human
being who has experienced some extraordinary insight (e.g., Buddha).
Furthermore, on Fleischacker’s view, commitment to one of these traditions depends primarily on a non-rational faith or trust, and a central part
of his book is devoted to explaining “why it might be reasonable to place
such a non-rational faith or trust in the teaching of the text, passed down
by a community as sacred” (4). What does it mean to say that it is reasonable to place a non-rational trust in a text? On Fleischacker’s view, rational
arguments (and especially natural theology) can do very little to bring
about religious commitment. Instead, he thinks people are inspired by the
vision of life offered by revealed texts. Specifically, such texts can offer us
a better account of our overall good than any secular approach. Crucially,
accepting a text’s vision must be compatible with fully accepting modern
science and liberal morality. Hence, it can be reasonable to have faith in
a text. As he explains, Fleischacker himself is Jewish, and so he takes the
Torah as his sacred text, but he explicitly takes his argument to apply to
the texts of all the major world religions listed above.
The book itself is a (much) shorter and more accessible version of his
arguments in Divine Teaching and the Way of the World (Oxford University
Press, 2011). Consequently, the arguments on the whole tend to go by very
quickly and are often less than convincing. Natural theology, along with
the entire project of reformed epistemology, are dismissed in less than
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two pages, for example. Nevertheless, his approach to defending revealed
religion is innovative and a good reminder, especially to analytic philosophers, of the importance of revealed texts and the central role they can
(and should) play in the lives of believers.
Chapter 1 confronts a main problem for those sympathetic to revealed
religion: why should we trust a text that has obvious scientific and historical errors, as the Bible does? Why, especially, should we have faith if,
as many scholars (including Fleischacker) think, the miracles it reports
(including, centrally, the revelation at Sinai or the resurrection of Jesus)
never happened? Fleischacker’s answer is that, on their own terms, we
should understand these texts not as presenting historical truths but instead as of giving us some kind of ethical guidance. In the Hebrew Bible,
the term generally translated as “true” (emet) ordinarily “characterizes a
person or a way of acting rather than a sentence” (17). Adducing a variety
of examples, he concludes that “the point of calling something ‘true’ in the
Bible seems clearly to be that one can rely on it, not that it has survived the
tribunal of logic or empirical evidence” (18). Fleischacker then draws an
interesting distinction between experts and authorities. We use the former
when we know what we want to do but need help doing it (e.g., hiring an
electrician). We turn to authorities, however, when we are trying to figure
out what we want to do. In these terms, the Bible (and other revealed
texts) function as authorities, not experts. By giving us a vision of our
overall good, they offer us guidance on what we should do with our lives.
Importantly, they can do that without being true in a propositional sense.
Indeed, Fleischacker thinks it’s critical that they aren’t true in that sense:
if a text is going to be able to speak to people at all times and places, as
it should do if it’s genuine revelation, then it will need to be poetic and
metaphorical. To illustrate the point, Fleischacker offers the fictional example of the wise and honest sage Aloysius, who tells a person that she
will find a great treasure in the village over the mountain. Being greedy,
she rushes off to the village, only to find that it is suffering from severe
famine. But she stays to help alleviate the suffering, and is powerfully
affected by her relief work, with the result that she returns home feeling
good about herself. So she did discover a treasure, but it was the joy of
helping others, not money. But Aloysius also knew that, before she began
the journey, she was not in a position to appreciate such a treasure, and
so he gave her advice in the only way he could—metaphorically (21). The
point is that guidance about how to live one’s life can be offered—sometimes must be offered—in poetic, metaphorical, and obscure language. We
thus needn’t be bothered by historical inaccuracies or wonder whether
miraculous events ever occurred; the point of a revealed text is to offer us
a vision for our lives.
Precisely what kind of vision is the subject of chapter 2, which begins
with a Euthyphro-like dilemma: “do we learn what is good from our sacred texts or do we bring a notion of goodness with us in coming to those
texts?” (26). The answer is both: we need an antecedent understanding of
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morality and goodness to assess the trustworthiness of a text, but if the
text is to teach us anything, we must also expect that it will revise and
even upend our understanding of goodness. And this is how it should
be: any overarching vision of a good human life must comport with our
commonsense intuitions that, e.g., kindness, generosity, compassion, and
so forth, are good, while murder, stealing, and the like are bad. (If a text
does not comport with our basic moral intuitions, we have a strong reason
for rejecting it.) But when it comes to the question of how we ought to live
our lives, or about whether there is some great good that can give meaning
to our lives, (e.g., “being saved by Christ” or “overcoming attachment to
oneself”) we are often less sure, and it is here that revealed texts can help.
They provide answers (however obscure) to what Fleischacker calls the
“telic question” (from the Greek telos), which is “the question of how to
live overall” (34). The rest of the chapter contains an insightful discussion
of the relationship between answers to the telic question and morality, and
in particular about the role that telic views play in moral disagreement. A
central insight is that adherents of different religions can disagree in their
telic views while continuing to agree about the central points of morality
(which, on his view, largely concerns norms required to have a peaceful
and free society). This point leads to an insightful argument for why and
how we should not simply tolerate but also respect adherents of other
religions (or none) in chapter 7.
Still, why would a person turn to a purportedly revealed text for an answer to the telic question, especially texts written thousands of years ago?
Here is one reason: what if “the overall goal of our lives [were] ungraspable by our untutored senses and reason alone?” (43). Fleischacker thinks
that this is not only possible but in fact likely. The argument proper begins
in chapter 3, where he considers naturalistic answers to the telic question,
which he variously formulates as “what does the good human life look
like?” or “what is the purpose of life?” or even “what is the meaning of
life?” (note that these are not obviously the same question!). This chapter
is at once the most thought-provoking and also the most frustrating, but it
certainly repays careful study. The four naturalistic answers he considers
are helping others, love relationships, art, and the growth of knowledge. People
have often taken these, either singly or (more frequently) in combination
as ideals around which to structure their whole lives. Fleischacker’s arguments for rejecting them, however, are not very convincing. Consider
love relationships. Fleischacker only discusses two examples, erotic love
and the love of parents for their children. Although a new romantic love
can make everything else in one’s life seem more worthwhile, that feeling
fades after a while, “and most of us look back on that impression as an
illusion” (52). That’s certainly true enough, but he fails to consider how,
e.g., a more mature marital love, purified by the trials of life, can give
one’s life purpose and meaning. Regarding the love for one’s children, he
writes, “[w]hen immersed in caring for young children, that can seem an
activity of supreme importance, but of all the things we do in life, this
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one surely comes under the heading of ‘keeping life going so that we can
keep life going.’ . . . If we are here on earth to raise our children, what
are our children here for?” (52). The problem with this analysis is that
it conceives of value only in instrumental terms. Our relationships with
our children are part of what gives our lives value, not because our lives
are for the production of children, but because the inclusion of children
in our lives is a great good for us (and them). A larger worry, however, is
the fact that some of the very texts whose telic vision Fleischacker wishes
to support themselves appeal to the intrinsic value of love relationships.
(In the Christian tradition, e.g., see St. Ignatius of Loyola’s Suscipe prayer.)
More generally, theists, at least, will generally want to affirm the place
of all of these things—helping others, love, art, and knowledge—in their
account of a worthwhile life. Still, the idea itself will have some appeal
to theists, because they will also affirm that purely secular versions of
these goods, ones not caught up in a relationship with the divine, will
be (by themselves) inadequate goods around which to center a person’s
life. Fleischacker’s arguments for this claim, however, are woefully under
developed (at least in this book).
Chapter 4 turns to the nature of revelation and fleshes out why we
might find it inspiring. Fleischacker calls our attention to the fact that
nearly all revealed texts are poems. The Torah, for example, is a grand
epic poem. This is important because “at the core of revelation . . . is the
idea that our highest good is essentially mysterious” (67). Consequently,
it defies description in analytic philosophy prose and must be expressed
instead in verse. Fleischacker offers a few examples of how a text might
grab someone’s attention with “arresting” and “awe-inspiring” glimpses
of our obscure ultimate good. In his case, he trusts the Torah because he
“found in it a sublime presentation of the evils of idolatry, and a plausible
solution to those evils” (77). Similarly, a Christian might be captivated by
Paul’s talk of being part of the Body of Christ (whatever that comes to).
This chapter, too, wants further development, or at least more examples.
Although Fleischacker repeatedly talks about how revealed texts give us
inspiring glimpses of a mysterious good that can organize one’s entire life,
the reader never really gets a sense of that at all.
Granting that one is drawn in by the telic vision of, say, the Torah or
Paul, why should she trust it? Even if she thinks naturalistic values are
insufficient for guiding her whole life, it doesn’t follow that the view offered by a text, however captivating, is any more reliable. In chapter 5,
Fleischacker asks this very question: “my reasons for believing in a God
and an afterlife are much like my reasons for believing in the Torah: I think
the ethical value of believing these things to be reasons to think that they
are true. [But] how can that be? How can ethical considerations ever serve
as reasons to believe a factual claim?” (83). To answer, he draws upon
Kant’s argument for why we should believe in God: “we can reasonably
believe in certain factual claims if they cannot be disproven by science
or logic, and are necessary to our ability to see our lives as worthwhile”
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(84). Readers will find much to think about in his development of this
argument, but regardless of how successful one finds it, Fleischacker concludes with a worthwhile insight: “we do not, cannot, love reason alone,
or anything at which we arrive by reason alone. What inspires love in us
is not reason but something else. So if we are to love our lives, something
other than argument will have to orient them” (91).
Chapter 6 turns to the process of receiving revelation, and specifically
of textual interpretation. He begins by arguing convincingly against fundamentalists who think that a text can be interpreted literally. To his credit,
he (at least briefly) addresses the problem of how to interpret morally
difficult texts, such as Deuteronomy 21:18–21 (which says that rebellious
sons should be stoned to death). He argues that a text must be interpreted
holistically and, also, in a community. A text must ultimately be received at
the individual level—the question, after all, is how one ought to live one’s
own life—but reception “is fully received only in community” (107). After
all, much of what revealed texts do is structure communal practice, because
most of how a person lives her life, including work, raising children, and
education, is done in her community. Further, different communities give
rise to different ways of receiving and interpreting a text: “in the hands
of Meister Eckhart and Teresa of Ávila, Christian Scripture looks very different than it does in the hands of Thomas Aquinas” (110). All reception,
however, must strike a delicate balance between being faithful to the text
itself—one can’t simply read one’s desires into the text—while also interpreting it in light of one’s own moral beliefs. Revelation itself (the text) and
the reception of revelation are thus equally important.
One of the strengths of the book is chapter 7, which offers a compelling
argument for why and how adherents of a particular religious tradition
can and should not just tolerate but respect other traditions, that is, see
them as admirable and as able to teach us something. First, telic visions offered by revealed texts are obscure, which should prompt some epistemic
humility in us. I might be more inspired by one text than another, but perhaps I haven’t fully appreciated other texts. Further, one’s religion itself
can give one reason to respect, and learn from, other religions. Drawing
on his own Jewish tradition, Fleischacker points out that the revelation
at Sinai happens “immediately after Moses takes advice from his nonIsraelite father-in-law” (123). In the book of Jonah, “the Assyrians serve
as a model of repentance for Jews” (124). Other traditions can thus be the
source of moral inspiration. Their telic visions can also be valuable, for,
Fleischacker argues, they are all trying to answer the same kinds of questions: how to find meaning in life; how to overcome fear of death; how
to order the goals of one’s life; and so on. While a person will find the
vision of her own tradition the most moving, “we share the idea that these
[the telic visions offered by revealed texts] are the right sorts of reasons
to ground a religious commitment. We can therefore illuminate one another’s understanding of these reasons” (125). A final reason to respect
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other religions is that the criticisms made by religions against each other
can, at their best, help each tradition to ensure that it is living up to its own
telic vision.
Fleischacker’s overall goal is to show how trust—faith—in what one
takes to be a revealed text is perfectly sensible (indeed, even wise) and fits
well alongside liberal morality and modern science. Although readers will
no doubt be frustrated by some of the arguments, and find him overreaching in places, the book is clear, interesting, and absolutely worth reading. I
was left eager to read the fuller version of the arguments in Divine Teaching
and the Way of the World.

Taking Pascal’s Wager: Faith, Evidence, and the Abundant Life, by Michael
Rota. IVP Academic, 2016. Pp. 255. $20.00 (paperback).
TRENT DOUGHERTY, Baylor University
The first thing to know about this book is that the subtitle—Faith, Evidence
and the Abundant Life—is much more informative about the contents than
the main title, Taking Pascal’s Wager. The majority of the book isn’t really
about Pascal’s wager at all. There is good old two-step natural theology—
arguments for the existence of God followed by Christian apologetics—and
some really great case studies of persons of faith. Only the first relatively
short section is directly on Pascal’s wager: a chapter of preliminary concepts,
a statement of the argument, and two chapters of objections and replies,
including, especially the “many gods” objection. But since the problem of
pluralism is hardly a specialist’s objection, the argument really only gets
stated in chapter 4, which completes Part I: Uncertainty and Commitment.
A reader with much familiarity at all with the wager could skip the preliminary chapter as well as the first chapter of objections and replies. Part
II: Evidence presents a lovely cosmological argument from possibility and
necessity of the form that is neglected these days (including a helpful visual schema that I have myself used in classes for years). This is followed
by a pretty standard design argument of the fine-tuning variety. There follow two arguments for specifically Christian theism and a single chapter
discussing “counterevidence.” Part II is more than twice the size of Part I,
which contains the statement of Pascal’s wager. The final section, Part III:
Saying Yes to God, focuses on the lives of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Jean Vanier,
and Immaculée Ilibagiza, and is very edifying.
What ties the book together is that Rota conceives of his main argument
as taking this form (from his Introduction).
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